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The traditional notion of security has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. We now 
live in a world where war is no longer being fought primarily against nations but within nations. 
The concept of human security put forward by the United Nations is viewed through the lens of 
the individual rather than the state. By having a right to the “freedom from fear” and “freedom 
from want”, this paper examines how EU foreign and defense policies have evolved since human 
security and the Responsibility to Protect have emerged. This paper analyzes both concepts against 
the five main documents of EU defense policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy (1992); 
European Security and Defense Policy (1999); European Security Strategy (2003); Common 
Security and Defense Policy (2009); and the European Union Global Strategy (2016). By 
examining both the literature and a real case study on how the EU reacted to Libya, this paper 
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“The battle of peace can only be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where 
victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory 
means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring 
peace... (UNDP 1994, 24).” This quote was taken from U.S. Secretary of State Edward R. 
Stettinius Jr. following the 1945 San Francisco meeting that created the United Nations. Since 
the end of the Cold War, our understanding of security has changed. The traditional view of 
security was concerned primarily with nation-states rather than the individual and their fear from 
external aggressors. Conflicts are now fought within nations rather than between nations often 
resulting in humanitarian crises. Security needs to be viewed from the perspective of the ordinary 
person who is seeking security in their daily life. Security must now shift its focus to include 
non-traditional threats such as disease, hunger, crime, terrorism, unemployment, and political 
repression. These threats are likely to transcend borders and will require an international 
response moving forward (UNDP 1994, 22). 
Europe and the post-Cold War world order is changing; democracy is facing new 
challenges and human rights violations can be found in even the most stable democracies. “For 
centuries, Europe was a continent of war. However, after the Second World War, the European 
Union (EU) has become a most successful peace project, being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 
2012. Today the EU’s ambition is to be a global actor for peace more than ever” (EEAS 2018). 
Both the United Nations (UN) and the EU have served as the leading actors in the global 
commitment to the promotion of human rights. The EU should promote its core values of the 
protection for, and the respect of, universal human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in both 
its internal and external policies. 
The United Nations introduced two critical concepts that have impacted the global 
direction of the human rights movement within the last 30 years. Human security and the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) have been central in response to humanitarian crises throughout 
the world. Human security was first introduced in the 1994 Human Development Report by the 
United Nations Development Programme as a way of shifting security from its traditional 
Westphalian state-oriented approach to a people-centric approach. The UN prediction that human 
security would revolutionize society in the 21st century, coinciding with the 1994 Rwandan 
Genocide and lack of international response, gave rise to the controversial concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P).    
This paper seeks to understand how the evolution of human security and R2P have 
shaped EU common security and defense policy. First, this paper will look at the conceptual 
history and literature on the evolution of human security and the Responsibility to Protect. It will 
then analyze the following five periods of EU common foreign and defense policy to examine 
the prevalence of human security concepts and R2P within the following documents: 1992 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, the 1999 European Security and Defense Policy, the 2003 
European Security Strategy, the 2009 Common Security and Defense Policy, and the 2016 
European Union Global Strategy. This paper will also explore EU reactions in relation to the 
humanitarian case of Libya. Finally, this paper will analyze the findings of both the literature and 
the case study to determine if these two concepts are responsible for the shift in how the EU 
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frames its common security and defense policy and how it responds to humanitarian crises 




         The 21st century brought about new challenges that cannot be solved by a single nation 
state. Since the end of the 20th century, the nature of armed conflict has transformed from large 
interstate wars to violent internal conflicts where the vast majority of casualties are civilians 
(R2P 2019; Simon 2008). These Intrastate conflicts are not as cogent as those between rival 
states because they often involve non-traditional tactics and are fought between a state 
government and armed groups. Additionally, the majority of these are fought over religious 
differences as well as ethno-cultural tensions (Münkler 2005, 2). Due to their contentious nature, 
intrastate conflicts are much harder to resolve than traditional warfare. The largest problem the 
international community faces in these instances is the displaced populations fleeing across 
borders in search for international protection. These asylum-seekers will typically seek shelter in 
countries that are not a part of the conflict, which increases overall visibility within the 
international community, often leading to humanitarian crises. Such crises now pose new 
security problems to Europe and the world.   
Research in this area has largely been focused around the lexis of human security rather 
than the praxis of human security. For example, Kalder et al (2007), found that many policy 
practitioners actively “do human security, we just don’t call it that” (274). However, this creates 
a divide between “calling” something human security and “doing” human security. This divide 
can be found in the European Security Defense Policy (ESDP) because while it never explicitly 
mentions human security, it performs in three areas that would fall under “doing” human 
security. These are crisis management, civil-military coordination and conflict prevention 
(Kalder et al 2007, 275). This piece argues that the European Union needs to use the term human 
security because it would offer a new dimension to the way the EU deals with conflict and 
instability. Without using human security and only “doing” human security it only exacerbates 
the already fragmented rhetoric surrounding EU policy, making it less visible and less 
transparent (2007).  Using the lexis of human security helps draw on other concepts in the 
current global discourse, such as the Responsibility to Protect and human development. 
Others argue that human security as defined by the United Nations has failed since its 
original inception but that the EU has a chance for reviving a “second generation of human 
security” (Martin and Owen 2010). The main argument behind the belief that human security 
under the UN failed is that institutionalization cannot compensate for poor conceptualization 
and, without a clear conceptualization, this notion quickly loses any meaning at all. Specifically, 
“within the UN, human security became too many things to too many people. With breadth came 
fragmentation as security was diffused across a horizontally defined terrain” (Martin and Owen 
2010, 220). The EU has avoided this pitfall by successfully positioning the concept of human 
security as a viable strategic narrative for a supranational foreign policy. Putting forward 
recommendations for the EU to establish a clear conceptualization of human security and to 
articulate a specific political narrative for how security will be used will be crucial for the 
survival of human security within the EU. 
The most recent study on this topic titled, “The European Union’s human security 
discourse: where are we now?” by George Christou, assesses the extent to which human security 
is actually featured in EU contemporary discourse and practice (2014). The most notable 
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contribution to the literature produced by this article comes from an in-depth analysis of how 
human security is perceived by relevant EU policy makers. Christou argues throughout this study 
that human security has not been embedded as the driving strategic concept behind EU Common 
Security and Defense Policy.  
By expanding on these three main pieces of literature, this study seeks to bridge the gap 
that exists between human security and R2P as components of EU foreign policy. This will be 
achieved by examining the conceptual history and the prevalence in which these two concepts 
are reflected throughout the five different periods of EU policy. Further examination will involve 




The Concept of Human Security 
These changes in conflict have transformed the traditional notion of what it means to be 
secure. In order to respond to these challenges there must be a shift in the way states view 
traditional national security threats to include non-military threats. Traditional security revolves 
around the protection of the nation state from external aggressors and for this reason is not able 
to tackle (address) the new threats that civilians are facing within intrastate conflicts and as a 
result of globalization. The concept of human security was created as a way to address these new 
issues while expanding the traditional concept of security.  “Human security is a child who did 
not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not 
explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with 
weapons—it is a concern with human life and dignity” (UNDP 1994, 22). The principle of 
human security was first introduced in the 1994 Human Development Report by the United 
Nations Development Programme.  
This report changed the way that security was defined in a post-Cold War context in 
order to include non-traditional threats like hunger, disease, and lack of access to basic 
necessities. Prior to this report, the concept of security referred to the perceived security of a 
nation state from external aggressors. Important questions relating to who the main provider of 
security is and who or what is the main object of security have emerged as a consequence to this 
shift in focus from the nation state to the individual. It is crucial to note that human security is 
not intended to displace state security. Instead, their relationship is complementary: “human 
security and state security are mutually reinforcing and dependent on each other. Without human 
security, state security cannot be attained and vice versa” (CHS 2003, 6). Furthermore, states can 
be responsible for not having human security. There are many cases like Syria, where according 
to human rights groups- the vast majority (94%) of Syrian civilians killed, have been killed by 
the government of Bashar Al-Assad and its allies (Syria Campaign 2019).  
At the time of the 1994 report, UNDP put forward four essential characteristics of human 
security. First, human security is a universal concern that is relevant to all people and can vary in 
intensity such as crime, unemployment and human rights violations. Second, the components of 
human security are interdependent, resulting in all nations getting involved. Examples of this can 
be as a result of famine, disease, and terrorism due to their transnational consequences. Third, 
human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention. Lastly, human 
security is people-centered. This was presented with seven categories of security challenges: 
economic, food, health, environment, personal, community, and political.  (UNDP 1994, 22-23). 
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The UN’s call for a world ‘free of want’ and ‘free of fear’ at the UN Millennium Summit 
in 2000 resulted in the creation of an independent Commission on Human Security. This 
Commission was established under the co-chairmanship of Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen to 
mobilize support and promote greater understanding of human security, develop further the 
concept as an operational tool, and outline a concrete action plan for its implementation (United 
Nations, n.d.). In 2003, the Commission on Human Security released its final report titled 
Human Security Now, which provided a concrete framework for the application of human 
security. Part of the new framework was an alternative definition from the one set forth under the 
1994 Human Development Report. The Commission defined human security as the protection of 
the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance freedoms—the essence of life, and human 
fulfillment (Human Security Now, 2003, 4). This can be achieved using a hybrid approach. 
Specifically, it combines top-down norms, processes and institutions with a bottom up focus in 
which democratic processes support the important role of individuals in defining and 
implementing their freedoms (Human Security Now, 2003, 10).  
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan used the three components of human security-freedom 
from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity at the main thematic principles of 
his final proposal. Later adopted in the 2005 World Summit Outcome, this reference to human 
security by Kofi Annan was pivotal in advancing the acceptance and understanding of human 
security in the United Nations. Between the years 2005 and 2012, this concept would only 
continue to gain more traction. In 2012, the UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290, “Follow-
up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit Outcome” was adopted, 
affirming the universal value of human security. In it, they agree that “human security is an 
approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting 
challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people” (66/290, 2012, 3). This 
resolution marked the first time that a common understanding on human security received global 
consensus due to the fact it was based on the views expressed by the UN Member States (United 
Nations, n.d.). This common understanding included the following points, further establishing 
the framework in which human security must be conducted:  
 
The notion of human security is distinct from R2P and its implementation; does not entail 
the threat or use of force/coercive measures; based on national ownership; governments 
retain the primary role and the responsibility for ensuring the survival, livelihood and 
dignity of their citizens; requires greater collaboration from the international community 
for the support to governments upon their request; and it must be implemented with full 
respect for the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the UN (66/290, 2012).  
 
This framework has been adopted by many western countries and will later be examined to see if 
it can be found within the EU’s legislation. Next, this paper examines the conceptual history of 
the Responsibility to Protect.  
 
The Responsibility to Protect   
 Recognizing the failure to adequately respond to the most heinous crimes known to 
humankind, world leaders made a historic commitment to protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity at the UN 2005 World Summit. This 
commitment, entitled the Responsibility to Protect, stipulates three pillars of responsibility. First, 
the State carries the primary responsibility for the protection of populations from genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Second, the international community has a 
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responsibility to assist States in fulfilling this responsibility. Third, the international community 
should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to protect populations 
from these crimes. If a state fails to protect its populations, or is in fact the perpetrator of crimes, 
the international community must be prepared to take stronger measures, including the collective 
use of force through the UN Security Council (World Summit Outcome 2005 Articles 138-140; 
globalr2p.org).  
These principles first originated in a 2001 report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) as a response to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s 
question of when the international community must act and intervene on humanitarian grounds. 
R2P stresses the value of prevention and early response. The three pillars have no set sequence 
and are not viewed as one being more important than the other.  In January 2009, the UN 
Secretary-General released a report on implementing R2P. The post-debate held in July 2009 
regarding R2P where all UN Member States overwhelmingly reaffirmed the 2005 commitment 
to R2P (A/63/677 2009). The Security Council has invoked R2P in more than 65 resolutions 
since 2006. The Human Rights Council has also since 2006, invoked R2P in over 30 resolutions 
(globalr2p.org) 
 The most striking and dramatic use of R2P and the contentious third pillar involving 
military intervention can be seen in the 2011 humanitarian intervention in Libya. UN Security 
Council Resolution 1973 directly accepted and authorized the use of military force as a part of 
R2P in Libya. This force included the use of no-fly zones, arms embargoes, asset freezes and a 
ban of flights (S/RES/1973 2011). The use of military force in the concept of R2P is not in any 
way the main tool for ensuring protection and should only be deployed as a last resort.  
 Nearly 10 years after the first debate on R2P, the UN General Assembly put forward 
another report in 2018 titled, “Responsibility to protect: from early warning to early action” 
(A/72/884-S/2018/525). The opening of this report is as follows: 
 
Despite progress in implementing the principle of the responsibility to protect, the 
international community continues to fall short where it matters most: the prevention of 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and the protection of 
vulnerable populations. On the ground, trends continue to move in the wrong direction 
and civilians are paying the price with their lives. This problem exists not because the 
principle is weak or misplaced, but because the international community has been 
insufficiently resolute in its implementation and has allowed disagreements about the past 
to foil unity of purpose in the present (A/72/884-S/2018/525). 
 
This report calls for a strengthening of early warning and assessment by outlining a three-fold 
strategy. First, by reviewing and strengthening preventive capacities; second, by continuing to 
promote accountability; and third, expanding civilian action significantly for atrocity prevention. 
The European Union took a strong active role in this debate. Ambassador Joanne Adamson, 
speaking on behalf of the EU framed the debate by emphasizing that the EU, like the UN was 
born after the horrors of WWII in a spirit of “never again”. She said, “The Responsibility to 
Protect is at the core of our primary goal, and by failing in our Responsibility to Protect, we fail 
our very reason for being here” (Debate on R2P 2018). She further emphasized that the EU 
heavily supports Secretary-General’s focus on prevention as it resonates with the EU’s Global 
Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy. While R2P has been contentious since the 2011 use in 





 For the purposes of analyzing the question of what has shaped EU common  security and 
defense policy, this paper will be doing a detailed analysis of the five main documents of EU 
defense policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy (1992); European Security and Defense 
Policy (1999); European Security Strategy (2003); Common Security and Defense Policy (2009); 
and the European Union Global Strategy (2016). Taking the detailed characteristics behind the 
two concepts of human security and the Responsibility to Protect, we can then look for similar 
concepts and characteristics within the EU’s defense policies to see whether they are reflected or 
not. This paper will not only look at the number of times these two concepts are mentioned by 
name, but also the frequency in which the characteristics of these concepts appear. Furthermore, 
this paper will examine the EU’s public stance on both of these concepts by looking at public 
statements put forward by top EU officials. The EU should promote its core values of the 
protection for, and the respect of, universal human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in both 
its internal and external policies. In order to see if this is truly reflective of the EU, this paper 
will not only examine the implementation of the policies but also analyze the EU’s response to 
Libya. Finally, this paper will analyze the findings of both the main EU documents in the field as 
enumerated above and the case study to determine if the two concepts of human security and 
R2P are responsible for the shift in how the EU frames its common security and defense policy 
and how it responds to humanitarian crises beyond its borders.  
  
Analysis of EU Defense Policies Over Time 
 
 Since the end of the Cold War the EU has put forward numerous efforts to respond to 
new and old security threats. One way the EU has done this is through its attempts at including 
the concepts of human security and R2P. The EU, as a global leader in liberal values should be at 
the forefront for doing the most at advancing these concepts within its internal and external 
policies.  
 
Common Foreign and Security Policy  
 The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht put forward 5 objectives for the European Union. One of 
these objectives was to “assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the 
implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a 
common defense policy, which might in time lead a common defense” (TEU 1992, Art. B, 8). 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) enabled the EU to speak and act as one entity 
in the international arena. The objectives of the CFSP were: to safeguard the common values, 
fundamental interests and independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union and 
its Member States in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in 
accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final 
Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; to promote international cooperation; and to develop 
and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms (TEU 1992, Art J.1, 123-124). The Treaty of Maastricht solidified the fact that the 
European Union was a supranational organization that would champion human rights, peace, and 
international security.  
 
European Security and Defense Policy  
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  Since the Cologne European Council of 1999, the EU has been implementing a European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) under High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, Javier Solana. ESDP serves as an integral part of the CFSP. Its main 
objectives are crisis management operations and other activities, as well as developing new 
instruments and concepts aimed at attaining these goals. It focuses on military and civilian crisis 
management operations, including responses to natural, humanitarian and other disasters 
(Cologne European Council 1999). By incorporating the ‘Petersburg Tasks’, an agreement made 
in 1992 by the Western European Union, served to define the ambitions of the EU, into the 
EDSP. This helped to provide the conditions under which military units could be deployed 
(EEAS 2016b). High Representative Solana credits the Kosovo disaster as also playing a major 
role in triggering a common desire on the part of Europeans to act together to develop within EU 
framework all the instruments necessary for defusing crises (Gnesotto and Solana 2004, 5). 
ESDP was able to be used in the crisis situations of Bosnia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The success of the operations in Africa 
and the Balkans while modest, proved that the ESDP could contribute to crisis stabilization and 
the prevention of humanitarian disasters. It is clear that the aims and objectives that the notion of 
human security serves can undeniably be found in the missions of the European Security and 
Defense Policy.   
 
European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World  
 High Representative Javier Solana put forward to the European Council in 2003, a 
document entitled “A Secure Europe in a Better World”. This document was adopted in 
December 2003 and emphasized the need for a multilateral and global approach to security in 
Europe and throughout the world (Council of the EU 2003). The European Security Strategy was 
designed to set out a policy framework for the EDSP and broadened its missions to include joint 
disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security reform 
(Campos 2014, 30).  
 The first portion of ESS identified several key threats and global challenges facing 
Europe. “Large scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe 
faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable” (Council of the EU 
2003, 3). These threats included terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional 
conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. Taking into account these different threats, the EU 
put forward three strategic objectives in response: to address the threats, build security in the 
EU’s neighborhood, and to commit to an international order based on effective multilateralism 
(Barcelona Report 2003). First, the EU must be able to defend itself against threats, be it 
terrorism or weapons of mass destruction. Second, the EU must secure its neighborhood, aware 
of the dangers occurring in the bordering regions is critical for ensuring EU security. Third, the 
establishment of a world order based on effective multilateralism is the most significant part of 
the ESS. The EU will continue to support the United Nations, recognizing that the UN forms the 
core of this multilateral system (Schilder and Hauschild 2004, 7).  
The final part of the ESS delves into the implications for EU policy resulting from the 
aforementioned threats and strategic objectives. For the EU to become more effective and live up 
to its potential, it needs to be 1) more active, 2) more capable, and 3) more coherent. First, the 
EU has to become more active in pursuing its strategic objectives by creating a strategic culture 
that would foster early, rapid, and robust intervention. To prevent conflict and excel in crisis 
management, the EU must combine military, civilian, and diplomatic activities. Second, the EU 
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must become more capable of action by being more efficient and improve sharing of intelligence 
and resources among its Member States. Third, the EU must become more coherent. This can be 
done by fostering international cooperation as well as bringing together its own different 
instruments and capabilities (Council of the EU 2003, 6). Combining all parts of the EES, the EU 
begins to form a basic and comprehensive approach to crisis management but does not clarify 
when or under what conditions to act. Despite the notion of human security not being explicitly 
mentioned in the document, it is clear that the concept of human security and its parameters were 
being reflected in the text. 
One of the main objectives of the 2003 ESS was in support of the Responsibility to 
Protect. This objective aimed to build a rule based international order, while continuing to 
uphold and develop International Law. Given their commitments as signatories to the Geneva 
Conventions, Member States maintained their respect for international humanitarian law 
worldwide through the Responsibility to Protect. EU members also respected the ESS’s 
evaluation that in a period of globalization, severity of threats cannot be determined by 
proximity. Therefore, Europe should be prepared to take part in the responsibility for global 
security. Since then, increased clarity has been established in that the brutalities R2P aims to 
address can incite terrorism, state fragility and regional conflicts which the ESS has recognized 
as being primary threats to the EU. The continuation of killing, raping, forced displacement and 
other war crimes against civilians provokes fear and resentment which prevents conflict 
resolutions between the Middle East and the DRC (Oxfam International 2008). 
In 2008, the EU published an implementation report on the ESS for its fifth anniversary. 
In this report, for the first time, the Council of the EU explicitly refers to human security as 
central to the EU’s strategic goals. “Drawing on a unique range of instruments, the EU already 
contributes to a more secure world. We have worked to build human security, by reducing 
poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, 
and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity” (European Union, 2008, 2). This report 
also faced heavy criticisms due to the lack of a clear understanding of when the EU should 
intervene in humanitarian crises.  
 
Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)  
 In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon was signed by all EU Member States entering into force on 
December 1st, 2010. Lisbon made significant changes in the field of EU security and defense. 
One of these main changes was the renaming of the European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The Common Security and 
Defense Policy (CSDP) enabled the EU to take a leading role in peacekeeping operations, 
conflict prevention and in the strengthening of the international security. It is an integral part of 
the EU’s comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military 
assets (EEAS 2016b). Noting the extension made to the ‘Petersburg Tasks’ in the ESDP, this was 
further expanded in CFSP to include “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue 
tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization 
(Lisbon Treaty 2007, Art. 43). Another notable change was made to Article 28 A paragraph 7 
which called for a solidarity clause stating, “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression 
on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance 
by all the means in their power, in accordance with Art. 51 of the UN Charter” (Lisbon Treaty 
2007). Lisbon merged the High Representative of CFSP with the Commissioner of External 
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Relations resulting in the creation of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy.  
 This change in Lisbon led to the creation of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) in 2010, which serves as the diplomatic arm to the EU. The purpose of the EEAS is to 
assist the High Representative to carry out the Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. The EU’s 
policies for its External Action can be found under the General Provisions in the Treaty of 
Lisbon. This included: 
 
The Union‘s actions on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to 
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of 
equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and 
international law. (Lisbon Treaty 2007, Art 21).  
 
Specifically, the EEAS’s main objective is to enhance coordination between military and civilian 
actors in crisis management as well as bring together an extensive network of EU diplomats, 
civil servants, and the European Commission (EEAS 2016c). 
 The expansion of action and the formation of the EEAS made by the Lisbon Treaty can 
be viewed as clear components of human security. Despite the formal mention of human security 
in the Lisbon Treaty, it is clear that strategic goals and actions of the EU on in the CFDP are key 
elements found within the notion of human security. Furthermore, the inclusion of “conflict 
prevention and peace-keeping tasks and the tasks of combat forces” can be viewed as an 
expansion of the EES in its inclusion of the concept of R2P. It seems to be that the EU is largely 
expanding and pushing the notion of human security in its foreign and security agenda without 
explicitly naming it as such.    
 
European Union Global Strategy 2016 
 The EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy presented in June 2016 
highlights the strong link between external and EU-internal security under a changing 
geopolitical setting. No single country can face emerging global threats alone. Thus, when it 
comes to security, the interests of all EU Member States are inseparably linked (EEAS 2018c). 
Within the Global Strategy, the EU identified five priorities it would pursue for external action. 
Broadly speaking these were: the security of our Union, state and societal resilience to our East 
and South, an integrated approach to conflicts, cooperative regional orders, and global 
governance for the 21st century (EEAS 2016a, 9-10). One notable aspect of the EU Global 
Strategy is the heavy presence of human security and R2P.  
Under their priority on global governance for the 21st century, the EU explicitly calls for 
a reform to the UN and the Security Council. In the meantime, the EU stated it would continue to 
call upon members of the UN Security Council to not vote against credible draft resolutions on 
timely action (R2P), which since the 2011 Libya intervention has remained controversial within 
the Security Council (EEAS 2016a, 39-40). One way the EU is taking initiative in this area is by 
seeking to widen the reach of international norms, regimes and institutions. The EU will continue 
to use every means possible to prevent humanitarian crises and will continue to promote R2P, 
international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international criminal law 
(EEAS 2016a, 14;42).  
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“Human security is at the core of all our actions and wherever we can, we engage at an 
early stage to prevent conflicts and save lives, also in close cooperation with civil society on the 
ground. We also stay engaged in the aftermath of conflict to ensure that peace takes root and 
countries do not slip back into instability and violent conflict. We are convinced that this is the 
best way to invest in lasting peace” (EEAS 2018b, section 2 page 8). Two years since the release 
of the EU Global Strategy the global system has become more uncertain and less stable (EEAS 
2018b,5). It is within this context that the European Union continues to be a leading force for 
democracy and diplomacy. 
 
 Case Study: Libya  
 
 The crisis in Libya seized the attention of the international community in February 2011 
when civilians conducting peaceful protests demanding for the end of the Gaddafi regime turned 
violent. Innocent civilians’ protesters were being shot down by snipers under the control of 
Gaddafi. Protests that began in the capital city of Tripoli spread within weeks across the country 
to the city of Benghazi in what became the oppositions stronghold. Gaddafi expressed his clear 
intent to continue committing massive human rights violations by announcing to Benghazi that 
his army would show the opposition no mercy. Libya was facing a tipping point by February 
20th when widespread protests against Gaddafi’s regime were met with increased violence. 
Human Rights Watch determined after four days of violence the death toll stood at more than 
233 with another 1,000 or more wounded (Johnson and Mesure 2011; 
responsibilitytoprotect.org)  
 In response to the massive protests in Benghazi, Gaddafi broadcasted a speech on 
February 22, 2011; using language that was reminiscent of the genocide in Rwanda, stating that 
“he would rather die a martyr than step down. Calling on his supporters to attack the protesting 
“cockroaches” and “cleanse Libya house by house” until protestors surrendered” (AL JAZEERA 
2011). According to the Independent, 
 
Several reports said government-recruited mercenaries were behind the worst violence 
including sniper attacks and the use of heavy machine guns. A British-based IT 
consultant, Ahmed Swelim 26, originally from Benghazi said relatives told him the 
situation had reached a “critical point”. People are living in fear since Mr. Gaddafi 
brought in African mercenaries. They are dressing as normal people but doing random 
killings. They will shoot or cut people’s hands off. The whole city is erupting. People 
went out to protest peacefully. They want an end to this oppression. The death toll is 
much higher than reported. There are more than 200 dead. My cousin, a doctor at a main 
hospital, has seen the bodies. There are more than 1,000 injured (Johnson and Mesure 
2011).  
 
Faced with Gaddafi’s threat to massacre the entire city, it was clear that Libya and 
Gaddafi would fail to uphold its Responsibility to Protect, calling on the international 
community to intervene. In response, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
resolution 1970 on February 26 expressing grave concern at the situation in Libya and 
condemned the violence and use of force against innocent civilians. Resolution 1970 
referred Libya to the International Court, imposed an arms embargo, a travel ban, and 
strong sanctions (S/RES/1970 2011). When the violence continued, the UN Security 
Council passed resolution 1973 on March 13 that authorized the use of force to protect 
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civilians. Resolution 1973 marked the first time that the Security Council went against a 
state for the purpose of human protection as a reason for intervention (S/RES/1973 2011). 
 The resolution established a no-fly zone over Libya and on the 19th of March a 
coalition of nations, including 10 EU Member States began air strikes against the Libyan 
authorities on the basis on Resolution 1973. The United States, France, and the United 
Kingdom were at the forefront of these strikes. By the end of the month, NATO took over 
the mission titled “Operation Unified Protector”, tasked with enforcing the arms 
embargo, patrolling the no-fly zones, and the protection of civilians (NATO 2012). With 
the support of NATO and other international actors, the Transitional National Council 
had taken over Libya and Gaddafi was assassinated on October 20, 2011. Shortly after, 
NATO confirmed the end of Operation Unified Protector on October 31, 2011 (NATO 
2011).  
 The handling of the humanitarian crisis in Libya was considered to be both a 
failure and success. It was a success in that Gaddafi was taken out of power, but also a 
failure in that Libya did not become a long-term success story and is facing humanitarian 
issues today. The political will of using R2P has diminished significantly since its use in 
Libya and is not likely to be able to pass the Permanent 5 in the Security Council again. 
This explains why R2P has not been used in both the Syria Crisis and the worsening 
Yemen Crisis.   
 
Discussion of Findings 
 
 The objective of this paper was to analyze the two concepts of human security and R2P in 
relation to the shift in EU common security and defense policy. It is clear that the concepts of 
human security and R2P have become increasingly prevalent over the five periods of EU defense 
policy: 1992 Common Foreign and Security Policy, the 1999 European Security and Defense 
Policy, the 2003 European Security Strategy, the 2009 Common Security and Defense Policy, 
and the 2016 European Union Global Strategy. This paper found that the Treaty of Maastricht 
was the first step in placing the EU as a relevant supranational organization with core values 
surrounding democracy and human rights into the international arena. Between 1992 and 1999, 
we see significant improvement and growth in the European Security and Defense Policy as 
setting forth the beginning of a framework that would enable the EU to act. High Representative 
Javier Solana was a crucial player in this area and served as a champion for the inclusion of 
human security within EU policies. The Kosovo disaster had a large impact in motivating the 
European people to act because the EU realized, as a result of Kosovo, that they could not act 
and intervene within its own borders.  
 The ESS was the first time that human security was emphasized by identifying new 
nontraditional key threats that Europe faced and could only be solved with multilateral solutions. 
Recognizing the need to combine military, civilian and diplomatic activities as a way of 
excelling in crisis management.  “Drawing on a unique range of instruments, the EU already 
contributes to a more secure world. We have worked to build human security, by reducing 
poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, 
and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity” (European Union, 2008, 2). 
Furthermore, the EES was the first time we see a major emphasis on the concept of R2P in EU 
legislation and policies. CSDP brought about the most significant changes to EU foreign and 
security policy without ever explicitly mentioning human security and Responsibility to Protect. 
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However, it is incredibly clear within the framework and the objectives of the CSDP that the 
notions of human security and R2P were key drivers behind these policies.  
 The European Global Strategy is perhaps the most interesting emergence after Libya 
because the legislation calls for the UN Security Council to be reformed. This reform directly 
recognized the need for the EU and the international community to use human security and R2P 
to address the increased number of humanitarian crises occurring. The EU’s actions in Libya 
have been criticized for not being weak due to the lack of consensus among the EU Member 
States. This meant that the EU could not take a hardline stance on the crisis. In this context, this 
paper fully believes based on the evidence, that the principles of human security and the 
Responsibility to Protect have dramatically shaped EU common foreign and security policy. 
However, when it comes to executing these actions, such as in Libya, we see continuous failure. 
 This paper contributes to the literature by providing a clear examination and linking the 
two concepts of human security and R2P within the five periods of EU common foreign and 
security policy. This paper advises that more research needs to be done on how the EU has 
responded or not responded to alternative current humanitarian crises such as Yemen. This paper 
takes into account the challenging atmosphere that R2P faces in the UN Security Council and 
suggests that it serves the EU best interests to continue passing Council Conclusions that urge 
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